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The omnipotence paradox is a family of semantic paradoxes that explores what is meant by 'omnipotence'. If an omnipotent being is able to perform any action, then it should be able to create a task that it is unable to perform. Hence, this being cannot perform all actions (i.e. it is not omnipotent), a logical contradiction. The most well-known version of the omnipotence paradox is the so-called ''paradox of the stone'': "Could an omnipotent being create a stone so heavy that even they could not lift it?"〔Savage, C. Wade. "The Paradox of the Stone" ''Philosophical Review'', Vol. 76, No. 1 (Jan., 1967), pp. 74–79 〕 This phrasing of the omnipotence paradox is vulnerable to objections based on the physical nature of gravity, such as how the weight of an object depends on what the local gravitational field is. Alternative statements of the paradox that do not involve such difficulties include "If given the axioms of Riemannian geometry, can an omnipotent being create a triangle whose angles do not add up to more than 180 degrees?" and "Can God create a prison so secure that he cannot escape from it?" The omnipotence paradox is medieval, dating at least to the 12th century. It was addressed by Averroës (1126–1198) and later by Thomas Aquinas.〔Averroës, ''Tahafut al-Tahafut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence)'' trans. Simon Van Den Bergh, Luzac & Company 1969, sections 529–536〕 Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (before 532) has a predecessor version of the paradox, asking whether it is possible for God to "deny himself". ==Overview== A common modern version of the omnipotence paradox is expressed in the question: "''Can (omnipotent being ) create a stone so heavy that it cannot lift it?''" This question generates a dilemma. The being can either create a stone it cannot lift, or it cannot create a stone it cannot lift. If the being ''can'' create a stone that it cannot lift, then it seems that it can cease to be omnipotent. If the being ''cannot'' create a stone it cannot lift, then it seems it is already not omnipotent.〔 But, if the question is inherently required by the concept of omnipotence, then it seems the logic that allows it to be inherently required is a paradox, since the particular concept of omnipotence that requires it is a paradox. In short, the act of seeming to find that omnipotence is a contradiction-of-terms is founded on the act of conceiving something to construct the contradiction against. Prior to any ''act'', omnipotence is conceived as coherent both with itself and with the possibility of knowledge (which raises the question of what is the knowledge that constitutes the identifiability of omnipotence-as-a-paradox?). However, whether the concept of omnipotence itself is a material paradox—or is simply too obscure to us to preclude being construed by paradoxical thinking—the central ''omnipotence paradox'' issue is whether the concept of 'logically possible' is different for a world in which omnipotence exists than in a world in which omnipotence does not exist. This is the central issue because our sense of material paradox—and of the logical contradiction that material paradox expresses—are functions of the fact that we presuppose that something must exists that is inherently meaningful or logical. That is, something ''concrete'' not a compound of other things or concepts. So, for example, in a world with a materially paradoxical omnipotence, its paradoxicality seems either to be a material-paradox-of-a-material-paradox, or to be a non-paradox per the proposition that it exists (i.e., if it exists, then nothing has inherent meaning, including itself). Whereas, a world with non-paradoxical omnipotence, its own omnipotence coextensive with whatever forms the concrete basis of our presupposition that something must be inherently meaningful. The dilemma of omnipotence is similar to another classic paradox—the irresistible force paradox: ''What happens when an irresistible force meets an immovable object?'' One response to this paradox is that if a force is irresistible, then, by definition, there is no truly immovable object. Conversely, if an immovable object exists, then no force can be truly irresistible. Some claim that the only way out of this paradox is if the irresistible force and immovable object never meet. But, this way out is not possible in the omnipotence case—because the purpose is to ask if the being's own inherent omnipotence makes its own inherent omnipotence impossible. Moreover, an object cannot in principle be immovable, if a force exists that can move it, regardless of whether the force and the object meet. So while, prior to any task, it is easy to imagine that omnipotence coherent with itself, such a coherent omnipotence can't perform some imaginable task without compromising its coherence. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Omnipotence paradox」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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